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404 HARNED V. WATSON. [17 C. (2d) 
Tichenor, 156 Cal. 343 [104 Pac. 458, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
323], and People v. Moore, 48 Cal. App. 245 [191 Pac. 980]. 
[6] The trial court first instructed the jury that there 
was no evidence to sustain the allegation of seduction and 
that it could not award punitive damages. The court later 
told the jury to disregard such instruction. The appellant 
now complains that the giving and withdrawal of such in-
struction so confused the jury that it was prejudicial error 
sufficient to compel a reversal. We have already determined 
that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the award of 
punitive damages as a result of seduction and we do not feel 
that any prejudicial error was committed. 
We are not unmindful of the fact that this is not the usual 
breach of promise and seduction case, in which advantage was 
taken of a young and innocent girl. The plaintiff was a 
middle-aged woman who should have had sufficient worldly 
wisdom to guard against the situation in which she now finds 
herself. However, it cannot be denied that, on the faith of 
the promises of the defendant, she has suffered injury. She 
has given up her millinery business which was her only means 
of livelihood, and she will undoubtedly have difficulty in 
regaining it. Her relationship with the defendant was ap- . 
parently well known, so that she must now suffer the silent or -!r 
outspoken criticism of her friends and the community in 
which she must live. Such actions on the part of the plain-
tiff, in permitting the situation to exist, are not to be con-
doned, but when such acts occurred, actions for damages for 
breach of promise and seduction were permissible under the 
laws of this state. Evidence was sufficient to warrant the 
verdict of the jury; therefore, such verdict and the resultant 
judgment must be affirmed. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynol', J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 17, 1941. 
Feb. 1941.] PEOPLE v. REED. 405 
[Crim. No. 4323. In Bank.-February 18, 1941.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN REED, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide - Evidence-Weight and Su:fH.ciency-Evidence of 
Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-Circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to support a conVIction of murder in 
the first degree where it showed the possession of bills by 
the deceased which he frequently exhibited in a store, de-
fendant's patronage of such store, his identification on the 
night of the murder as he came running from the direction 
of the deceased's cabin, defendant's subsequent possession of 
money with conflicting accounts as to the manner of its 
acquisition, and blood stains on articles of his clothing. 
[2] Oriminal Law-Appeal and Error-Harmless and Reversible 
Error - Particular Errors - Argument and Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney-Oure by Striking Out and Instruction. 
Any impropriety in the district attorney's question as to 
whether the defendant had been previously convicted of a 
felony is without prejudice where the district attorney later 
stated that he asked the question in good faith expecting 
to be able to prove the conviction by documentary evidence, 
but that such evidence was not available and, therefore, he 
requested that the matter be expunged from the record and 
the jury instructed to disregard the question, and where the 
court complied with the request. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Bernardino County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Charles L. Allison, Judge. Affirmed. 
Charles D. Warner and Albert D. Trujillo for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, and Frank Richards, Dep-
uty Attorney-General, for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-John Reed and John Thurman were con-
victed of murder in the first degree. The jury recommended 
life imprisonment for Thurman; Reed was sentenced to die. 
They appeal from the judgment and the order denying their 
motions for a new trial. 
1. See 13 Oal. Jur. 602; 26 Am. Jur. 183, 486; 13 R. O. L. 776. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Homicide, § 145 (5) i 2. Criminal Law, 
§140S. 
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[1] The evidence establishes the following facts: George 
Stephenson, the deceased, lived alone in a cabin on the edge 
of the Colorado River near the little settlement of Cross-
roads, located in the southeast corner of San Bernardino 
County. He was sixty-nine years of age and received old 
age pension checks monthly in the amount of $40. From 
these payments he had saved about $300 or $350 which he car-
ried on his person in a billfold. When making purchases at 
the stores in Crossroads, it was not unusual for him to ex-
hibit his savings and to exchange small bills for ones of larger 
denomination. 
Down the dirt road about 150 feet from Stephenson's cabin 
was another cabin occupied by Henry Williams, an elderly 
negro. On the evening of Friday, March 15, 1940, Stephen-
son visited Williams for about a quarter of an hour. Shortly 
after Stephenson left to return to his own cabin, Williams 
heard him call in an unusually loud voice, "What does all 
this mean 1 What is this all about Y" Then all was quiet. 
Williams became uneasy and after a few minutes seized an 
ice pick and started for the Stephenson cabin. As he was 
proceeding along the dirt road which skirted the dense arrow 
weeds separating the two cabins, he saw two men come run-
. ning from the direction of Stephenson's cabin. One man 
came within eight or ten feet of him. This man he later 
identified as Reed. The other man appeared tall and thin, 
but was not otherwise clearly visible. Williams then pro-
ceeded to the cabin, but finding no one there, hastened to 
a nearby gas station and persuaded the proprietor to drive 
back withhini. The latter found Stephenson a few yards 
beyond the cabin, lying just at the brink of the river bed, 
bound and gagged, with his head badly beaten. He died 
a few hours later at the hospital. Upon search of his body 
and premises neither his billfold nor his money could be 
found. 
For several months before the commission of the crime John 
Reed had lived in the vicinity of Crossroads and patronized 
the same stores in Crossroads as the deceased. One week 
before the commission of the crime he secured a ride from 
Phoenix, where he had been working, to Parker, a town in 
Arizona not far from Crossroads, with a friend named Cox. 
At this time Reed had little or no money. He stayed in a 
cabin with Cox and another man named West, paying nothing 
~ 
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for accommodations. Three days before the commISSIOn of 
the crime, he met John Thurman, whom he had known for 
several years in Parker, and who was now out of work and 
without funds. The day before the crime Reed and Thurman 
visited Crossroads in the company of a man named Young. 
At that time Reed had a gun in his possession. On the 
day of the homicide he went to Crossroads with a man named 
Jack Hollis. At that time he wore a leather jacket and 
had a bundle under his arm. Thurman was seen in Cross-
J;'Oads the same afternoon. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon, 
shortly before the homicide was committed, Thurman was 
seen by two men who were acquainted with him walking 
in the direction of the deceased's cabin in the company of a 
man carrying a bundle under his arm. 
That night Reed exhibited a roll of bills to West, saying 
he had gotten them from an Indian to purchase liquor, and 
offered to pay West $25 fol' a ride to Phoenix or Wickenburg. 
West at first refused, having learned from Cox that Reed and 
Thurman were under suspicion· with regard to the homicide, 
but several days later West drove Reed to Phoenix and re-
ceived $25. While in Phoenix, Reed, accompanied by a Mrs. 
Scott with whom he was acquainted, purchased a suit of 
clothes and a used car. He was then picked up by two police 
officers. A wallet containing $113 was found in his car. 
His suitcase containing a leather jacket and other articles 
of clothing was found. The clothing was turned over to a 
chemist who found blood stains on the sleeve of tha jacket 
and a shirt. Upon being questioned about the money Reed 
gave contradictory stories-that he got it from Mrs. Scott; 
that he earned it selling whiskey; that he earned it selling 
stolen goods; that he got it from an Indian to purchase 
liquor. 
Thurman left Parker several days after the homicide and 
went to Wickenburg by train, and from there to Phoenix 
by train. Then he bought a ticket to Herford, Texas, but 
returned it and went to Fresno, California, by bus and there-
after by bus to Van Nuys where he was arrested. He had 
spent about $47 on his trip and had $6 at the time of his 
arrest. 
At the preliminary examination Henry Williams testified 
as to the circumstances surrounding the homicide and identi-
fied Reed as one of the men whom he had seen running from 
J III I· ·1,' 
I' 
.. 
408 PEOPLE v. REED. [17 C. (2d) 
the deceased's cabin. Shortly thereafter Williams disap-
peared. His clothes were found on the bank of the Colorado 
River near Crossroads, and his body was recovered from the 
river in an identifiable condition. At the trial the testi-
mony given by him at tl1e preliminary hearing was read into 
the record. 
The foregoing facts constitute evidence which, even though 
circumstantial, is substantial enough to have established the 
guilt of the two defendants in the minds of the jury. 
[2] Defendants contend that the district attorney was 
guilty of prejudicial misconduct at the trial in questioning 
Reed as to whether or not he had been previously convicted 
of a felony. On cross-examination Reed was asked whether 
or not he had been convicted of stealing government prop-
erty and sentenced under that conviction. The court per-
mitted the question over objection by counsel for the de-
fendants, and Reed answered "no". At the conclusion of 
the testimony in the case the district attorney stated that 
when he had asked the question regarding a prior convic-
tion, he had asked it in good faith, expecting to be able to 
prove the conviction by documentary evidence, but that such 
evidence was not available, and he therefore requested that 
the matter be expunged from the record and the jury in-
structed to disregard the question. The court complied with 
the request. In view of this subsequent statement by the 
district attorney, the expunging of the matter from the record 
by the court in compliance with the district attorney's re-
quest, and the absence of any evidence of bad faith on the 
part of the district attorney, there is no prejudicial miscon-
duct requiring a reversal. (People v. Braun, 14 Cal. (2d) 1 
[92 Pac. (2d) 402].) 
The judgment and order of the trial court are affirmed. 
~~ 
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Feb. 1941.] LONG V. LONG. 409 
[So F. No. 15969. Department Two.-February 19, 1941.] 
"LOUIS A. LONG, Respondent, V. MARGARET C. LONG, 
Appellant. 
[1] Divorce and Separation-Permanent Alimony-Modification 
of Allowance-Effect of Absence of Alimony Provision in De-
cree.-A court which has provided for alimony payments for 
a definite term without reserving the right to change or modify 
the term is without power to make further allowance for the 
wife's support after such alimony has been paid and the final 
decree has been entered. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County, setting aside an order modifying an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce. William P. James, Judge. Affirmed. 
David M. Burnett and John M. Burnett for Appellant.' 
Henry E. Monroe and Henriette W. Steinegger for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On January 7, 1930, the Superior Court 
of Santa Clara County awarded appellant Margaret C. Long 
an interlocutory decree of divorce against respondent Louis 
A. Long directing him to pay appellant $50 a month alimony 
for the six months from February 5, 1930, to and including 
JUly 5, 1930. This alimony was duly paid. The final decree 
of divorce, entered on March 30, 1931, neither awarded ali-
mony to appellant nor reserved to the court jurisdiction 
thereafter to make an allowance for appellant's support. 
On November 10, 1931, on application of appellant supported 
by an affidavit averring that because of injury she was no 
longer able to support herself, the court after a hearing made 
an order modifying the interlocutory decree of divorce by 
requiring respondent to pay $50 a month alimony thence-
forth until further order of the court. On December 20, 
1. Power to reopen decree of divorce which is silent as to or 
expressly provides against alimony so as to permit modification 
in that regard, note, 83 A. L. R. 1248. See, also, 1 Cal. Jur. 1035; 
17 Am. Jur. 494. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Divorce and Separation, § 216 (2). 
.J., 
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